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 Abstract  
The present study investigated incremental theorists’ metacognitive monitoring and 
study behaviours during a word-pair learning task. Sixty-five participants (38 female; 
aged 18-64 years, M = 33.92, SD = 14.40) studied English-Spanish word-pairs of 
differing difficulty (easy, moderate and difficult) and made judgments of learning 
(JOLs). Participants selected half of the word-pairs for restudy, before completing an 
initial cued-recall test to demonstrate the accuracy of their JOLs and study decisions. 
They then completed a restudy phase, incorporating a within-in subjects 
honour/dishonour manipulation, to assess the optimality of their study decisions. A 
final cued-recall test was administered, followed by Dweck’s (1999) Theories of 
Intelligence Scale. Endorsing more incremental views of intelligence was marginally 
associated with poorer calibration for difficult word-pairs, (r = .235, p = .062), and 
was negatively associated with metacognitive accuracy for easy word-pairs during 
the study choice phase (r = -.260, p = .036). No further impairments were evident 
for the other difficulty-levels of these statistics, nor on over-confidence, under-
confidence or resolution. Participants’ study choices reflected a Discrepancy 
Reduction approach, and in general, did not appear to be optimal. Future research is 
required to further clarify these findings in reference to a larger entity theorist 
comparison group.  
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People’s experiences of the world are not only determined by the external stimuli 
they encounter, but also by the meaning-making systems they use to perceive 
information through (Bartlett, 1932). This helps to explain why different people can 
respond to the same events in very different ways, as the interpretations they make 
inform their subsequent behaviour (Dweck, 1999). In an educational setting, it is of 
interest to know why some students adopt behaviours which have positive effects on 
their learning outcomes, such as seeking out challenge and persisting in the face of 
set-backs (Dweck, 1999), whilst others demonstrate less-optimal approaches, such as 
challenge avoidance and “helpless” responses to failure (Diener & Dweck, 1980; 
Dweck, 1999, Robins & Pals, 2002). One account for this observation is that students 
hold differing beliefs regarding the nature of intelligence, and their understanding 
forms a perceptual framework through which they make sense of their own 
experiences, and subsequently choose to engage in particular behaviours (Dweck & 
Leggett, 1988; Dweck, 1999).  
 According to Dweck and colleagues’ social-cognitive model, people hold 
implicit beliefs regarding their own intelligence (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck, 
Chui & Hong, 1995; Dweck, 1999). Two opposing views of intelligence are said to 
exist: an ‘entity’ theory, and an ‘incremental’ theory.  People holding an entity theory 
of intelligence (entity theorists) consider intelligence to be a fixed and stable internal 
trait, which ultimately can never be changed or improved. Incremental theorists 
however view intelligence as being a malleable attribute, which does have the 
capacity to be developed over time. Over the past three decades, research has 
demonstrated that the implicit beliefs people hold have implications not only for their 
self-concepts, but also the attributions they make, the behaviours they exhibit, and 
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their educational outcomes (eg. Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Hong, Chui, Dweck, Lin & 
Wan, 1999; Robins & Pals, 2002; Claro, Paunesku & Dweck, 2016).  
Differences between entity and incremental theorists  
One of the primary differences established between entity and incremental theorists 
is the type of motivational goal they show a preference for (Dweck, 1999). 
Possessing an entity view of intelligence is associated with the pursuit of 
performance goals (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Performance goals involve engaging in 
tasks in such a way that allows one to demonstrate their abilities, in order to illicit 
favourable impressions. Furthermore, pursuing performance goals involves avoiding 
situations or experiences that may reveal weaknesses or low ability. This is 
especially important to the entity theorist, who would consider one demonstration of 
inadequacy as indicative of an enduring internal flaw (Dweck, 1999). Consequently, 
entity theorists prefer easier tasks which carry minimal risk of them experiencing 
difficulty or failure (Dweck, 1999). Incremental theorists however are less concerned 
with displaying their intellect, and more interested in tasks which will allow them to 
develop their knowledge and abilities (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). They therefore 
prefer to pursue learning goals, characterised by challenging experiences which offer 
the opportunity to learn something new (Dweck, 1999). The influence of theories of 
intelligence on goal preference has not only been implied by correlational research, 
but also established through experimental research in which entity or incremental 
views of intelligence have been manipulated in students, and their subsequent task 
choice reflected the goal-orientation described above (for reviews, see Dweck and 
Leggett, 1988; Dweck, 1999).  
 Theories of intelligence also influence the meaning students derive from 
needing to exert effort in order to complete a task (Dweck, 1999). For example, 
4 
 
 
students have been demonstrated as judging others’ intelligence differentially, based 
on their own theory of intelligence (Hong et al., 1999, Study 3). Hong and colleagues 
manipulated college students to have either an entity or incremental view of 
intelligence, and then asked them to compare the intelligence of two students in a 
scenario; one student put high levels of effort into their study, whilst another put 
minimal effort into studying. The majority of entity theorists (77%) claimed the 
student who put minimal effort into their study was the most intelligent. By contrast, 
incremental theorists were just as likely to consider either student as being the most 
intelligent (50% for each student), suggesting that they did not systematically 
consider effort to be an indicator of low ability, as the entity theorists did. These 
findings are congruent with the assertion that entity theorists consider the experience 
of effort exertion to indicate they have reached the limits of their ability, whereas 
incremental theorists consider effort to be a signal that they are developing their 
abilities (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck, 1999). 
Implications of incremental orientation 
Adaptive responses to failure. The interpretive frameworks that incremental 
theorists use to understand their performance on tasks sets them up to respond 
differently to failure than entity theorists. Endorsement of an entity theory of 
intelligence is associated with helpless responses, whilst incremental theorists take a 
mastery-oriented approach, perceiving achievement as reliant on effort (Robins & 
Pals, 2002; Dweck, 1999). Research has demonstrated that when given difficult 
tasks, children with helpless orientations exhibit negative affect and self-cognitions, 
and a decline in performance over trials (Diener & Dweck, 1980). In particular, 
Diener and Dweck found these children tended to spontaneously attribute their 
failure to their own internal inadequacies, such as low intelligence. Helpless children 
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also diverted their attention away from the challenging task. Mastery-oriented 
children however did not display this pattern; rather, the challenging tasks motivated 
them to try harder, and ultimately thrive, as the majority of children (80%) 
maintained or improved their performance levels. Importantly, they did not 
disengage with the tasks or attempt to avoid the challenges. The finding that students 
operating under an incremental framework respond to failure more adaptively than 
their entity-oriented counterparts has been replicated with university students. For 
example, when comparing students who reported obtaining either poor or adequate 
grades, Hong and colleagues (1999, Study 2) found entity theorists with poor grades 
were not more likely to express interest in a remedial course, despite having a clear 
need for intervention. Incremental theorists reporting low grades did express a 
greater interest in the remedial course than both incremental theorists with high 
grades, and entity theorists in general, suggesting they respond more adaptively to 
failure than their entity theorist counter-parts.  
Superior educational outcomes. Given that students who endorse 
incremental views of intelligence are considered to respond more adaptively in the 
short-term to experiences of challenge and failure than their entity theorist counter-
parts, it is of little surprise that the literature consistently finds superior educational 
outcomes for incremental theorists (eg. Henderson & Dweck, 1990; Good, Aronson 
& Inzlicht, 2003; Blackwell, Trzesniewski & Dweck, 2007). For example, 
Henderson and Dweck (1990) followed students through their transition into junior 
high school (from 6th to 7th grade), a period characterised by posing many new and 
difficult challenges. Their research revealed entity theorists entering the 7th grade 
with either low or high levels of achievement obtained equal or worse marks 
(respectively) at the end of the year. Incremental theorists however either improved 
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or maintained their marks, depending on whether they had entered the 7th grade with 
low or high marks, respectively. Thus, having an incremental theory of intelligence 
seemed to offer protection from the decline in achievement that might otherwise 
occur (Henderson & Dweck, 1990). Similar results have been observed by Blackwell 
and colleagues (2007, Study 2), who demonstrated that teaching 7th grade students to 
adopt an incremental view of intelligence protected them from the downward 
trajectory in math grades experienced by their peers in a control group. 
 Impressively, the academic benefits of having an incremental theory of 
intelligence are particularly pronounced for students who would typically be 
considered to be disadvantaged, or ‘at risk’ of receiving poor grades (Aronson, Fried 
& Good, 2002; Claro et al. , 2016). For example, Aronson and colleagues (2002) 
demonstrated that encouraging African American college students (who generally 
receive lower grades than their White classmates) to promote an incremental view of 
intelligence resulted in them being awarded higher end of year marks than the 
African American participants in both active and inactive control groups. Similarly, 
in a study of all 10th grade students in government schools in Chile, Claro and 
colleagues (2016) found that endorsing incremental views of intelligence (as opposed 
to entity-oriented views) was associated with higher academic performance across 
every level of socio-economic status. Moreover, endorsing incremental views 
appeared to offer low-income students some protection against the relationship 
between low-income disadvantage and low academic achievement.   
Impaired metacognitive monitoring? Despite the aforementioned 
advantages of being an incremental theorist, there is some evidence to suggest that a 
short-term drawback may exist (Miele & Molden, 2010; Miele, Finn & Molden, 
2011). Specifically, it seems that incremental theorists may experience distortions to 
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their metacognitive monitoring (Miele, Finn & Molden, 2011). Metacognitive 
monitoring describes the process by which people are aware of their own cognitive 
experiences (Flavell, 1979). One way of measuring this is by asking people to make 
confidence judgements, such as judgments of learning (JOLs), which indicate how 
likely they think it is that they will be able to recall currently available information 
when tested in the future (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). High JOLs indicate that one is 
relatively confident of being able to produce the information on a future test, whilst 
low JOLs reflect a belief of being unlikely to recall the information. Confidence 
ratings can provide useful information about the likelihood of future recall (e.g. 
Koriat, 2008; Kornell & Bjork, 2008). It is important to acknowledge however, that 
confidence judgements are prone to bias from a variety of sources (Finn & Tauber, 
2015). One such source of influence is encoding fluency, which refers to the feelings 
of ease or difficulty experienced when trying to learn new information. The common 
finding that feelings of ease at encoding result in high JOLs, whilst feelings of 
difficulty at encoding result in low JOLs, suggest that people tend to follow an 
‘easily-learned, easily-remembered’ (ELER) heuristic (Koriat, 2008; Koriat & 
Ma’ayan, 2005). When information varies objectively in difficulty, whereby some 
material will require more effort to learn than other material, this heuristic is likely to 
lead to accurate judgements about future recall (Koriat, 2008).  
Given that entity theorists consider high levels of effort exertion to be 
indicative of low abilities, it is of little surprise that they tend to follow the ELER 
heuristic (Miele & Molden, 2010; Miele, Finn & Molden, 2011). In a study by Miele 
and colleagues (2011, Study 1), participants were given Indonesian-English language 
word-pairs to learn (each of which varied in difficulty, between easy, moderately 
difficult, or difficult to learn), and were asked to make a prediction (JOL) regarding 
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their likelihood of recalling a target (English) word when presented with the cue 
(Indonesian) word from each word-pair. Participants endorsing an entity theory of 
intelligence were well calibrated in their JOLs, revealing that at each level of item 
difficulty, their JOLs reflected their actual performance. As item difficulty was 
negatively related with encoding fluency, this suggests that entity theorists followed 
the ELER heuristic, which was in this case, an informative approach. Incremental 
theorists however did not appear to use the ELER heuristic. Rather, their judgements 
reflected an inversed heuristic (highly-engaging, easily-remembered, HEER), 
whereby they were under-confident on the easy items, and over-confident on the 
difficult items (Miele et al., 2011). Incremental theorists therefore considered the 
materials requiring high levels of effort to encode (which were objectively difficult) 
as well-learned, whilst materials requiring lower effort exertion (which were 
objectively easier) as less-well learned. This pattern of results has also been observed 
in research in which effort cues were not derived from differing levels of objective 
difficulty between stimuli (Miele & Molden, 2010, Studies 4 & 5). Thus, it seems 
that incremental theorists’ positive interpretation of effort may make them vulnerable 
to misguided metacognitive monitoring. 
As metacognitive monitoring influences decision making processes involved 
in study behaviours (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Schwartz & Perfect, 2002), it is 
conceivable that incremental theorists’ ability to engage in optimal study may be 
compromised. In order to assess whether this is the case, one must first establish 
what optimal study actually is. The literature has been predominantly divided 
between two accounts of optimal study: a Discrepancy Reduction (DR, eg. Nelson & 
Leonesio, 1988; Dunlosky & Thiede, 1998; Nelson & Narens, 1990) model, and a 
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Region of Proximal Learning (PRL, Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005; Kornell & Metcalfe, 
2006) account.  
The DR models suggest that people choose to allocate their study time 
preferentially towards the items that are considered to be most difficult (Nelson & 
Leonesio, 1988). Put another way, the focus of study is to reduce the greatest 
discrepancies between actual and desired knowledge. In three experiments of self-
paced study, Nelson and Leonesio (1988) observed a negative correlation between 
confidence ratings and study time, indicating that students were allocating the most 
time to the items they reported as being the most difficult. Due to multiple 
replications in the literature (for a review, see Son & Metcalfe, 2000), and its 
intuitive appeal, the DR model became the dominant account of study allocation. The 
apparent popularity of the DR model however, does not necessarily indicate that it is 
an optimal approach to take. Nelson and Leonesio’s (1988) own data demonstrated a 
negative correlation between study time and performance, suggesting this strategy 
did not yield optimal results.   
The DR model has also been critiqued for being based upon research in 
which students were allowed unlimited study time (Kornell & Metcalfe, 2006). 
Kornell and Metcalfe argued that students are typically required to study under time 
constraints, whereby allocating time for studying one item comes at the expense of 
studying another. When this is the case, and mastery is therefore unlikely, they claim 
that a different approach to study is likely to occur. The RPL framework suggests 
that in such conditions, students should focus their study on the easiest items that 
they have not yet learned (Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005; Kornell & Metcalfe, 2006). 
Indeed, when participants are given limited study time, research suggests they focus 
on the unlearned items that they have given the highest confidence ratings to (eg. Son 
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& Metcalfe, 2000, Studies 1 & 3). Similarly, in studies where participants are forced 
to select a limited number of items for restudy, the majority select items receiving 
higher confidence ratings (Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005, Study 6; Kornell & Metcalfe, 
2006, Studies 3a & 3b). Moreover, final test performance was greater for participants 
who followed this RPL approach than for those who did not (Kornell & Metcalfe, 
2006, Studies 3a & 3b). It is important to note however, that these studies advocating 
the optimality of the RPL framework only allowed participants to choose from items 
that they had demonstrated they did not know on a preliminary test. This model 
therefore assumes that students are able to accurately discern between items that are 
known and unknown, which is consistent with research findings (e.g. Masur, 
McIntyre & Flavell, 1973).  
Given the research suggesting that incremental theorists have compromised 
metacognitive monitoring, particularly in judging items that have and have not been 
learned (Miele et al., 2011, Study 1), it is conceivable that they may have difficulty 
following a RPL framework as successfully as their entity theorist counterparts. The 
current study therefore aims to investigate this possibility.  
The present study. 
The present study had three primary aims (outlined in the following 
paragraphs). The first was to replicate Miele and colleagues’ (Miele & Molden, 
2010; Miele et al., 2011) finding of compromised metacognitive monitoring for 
incremental theorists, compared to entity theorists, when learning items of differing 
objective difficulty. Assuming incremental theorists made inaccurate initial 
confidence judgments, the next aim was to investigate what impact this would have 
on their study behaviour. Specifically, it was of interest to know whether incremental 
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theorists would have greater difficulty than entity theorists in selecting unknown 
items for restudy. Finally, the present study sought to investigate which study 
approach (DR or RPL) would lead to superior performance on a final cued-recall 
test.  
It was hypothesised that participants endorsing incremental views of 
intelligence would make JOLs which would not be predictive of their actual 
knowledge demonstrated on an initial test. Based on the HEER heuristic (Miele et 
al., 2011), it was anticipated that incremental theorists would under-estimate their 
learning of objectively easier (and less engaging) stimuli, and over-estimate their 
learning of difficult (and highly engaging) stimuli. As entity theorists have been 
shown to follow the ELER heuristic (Miele et al., 2011), which provides valid 
learning cues when items differ in objective difficulty (Koriat, 2008), it was 
anticipated that their JOL ratings would better reflect their actual performance. 
In regards to the consequence of compromised metacognitive monitoring on 
study behaviours, two possible outcomes were anticipated. Firstly, if incremental 
theorists had difficulty assessing the extent to which they had learned items, then 
they may have difficulty appropriately selecting items for restudy. In this case, 
incremental theorists would be expected to show poorer resolution than entity 
theorists; that is, they would be less able to accurately distinguish between known 
and unknown items.  Alternatively, any differences that exist between incremental 
and entity theorists’ metacognitive monitoring immediately after an item’s 
presentation may disappear by the time they make their study decisions. Indeed, 
research has shown that confidence judgements tend to be less biased when they are 
taken after a delay in time, rather than during study (‘delayed-JOL-effect’, Nelson & 
Dunlosky, 1991). As participants made their study choices after all items were 
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presented, these decisions were effectively delayed JOLs, thus any impairment in 
incremental theorists’ monitoring might be cancelled out.  
Finally, as the design of the current study limited participants’ study time, it 
was anticipated that following a RPL framework (rather than a DR model) would be 
the most popular, and optimal, approach. Therefore, it was hypothesised that the 
mean JOLs made for items that were later selected for restudy would be greater than 
the mean JOLs of items not selected for restudy. Moreover, it was expected that there 
would be a positive relationship between the mean JOLs for items chosen for restudy 
and final test performance, whereby greater average JOL ratings for the items 
restudied were anticipated to be associated with higher recall performance on the 
final test.  
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-eight participants were recruited for the present study from the 
communities of the University of Tasmania and Flinders University. Due to non-
compliance with experimental instructions, three participants were excluded. The 
final sample comprised 65 participants (38 females), ranging in age from 18-64 years 
(Mage = 33.92 years, SD = 14.40). Participants were required to report being able to 
fluently read and write in English, and to not be fluent in Spanish. Participants were 
either reimbursed $20 for their time, or awarded course credit.  
Materials 
 The current study was presented to all participants on desktop computers via 
LimeSurvey software (Version 2.06; Schmitz, 2015). The stimuli used were 48 
English-Spanish word pairs taken from Metcalfe (2002). The word-pairs selected 
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were classified as being either easy (16 pairs), medium (16 pairs) or difficult (16 
pairs) to learn (as indicated by Metcalfe, 2002). For the purpose of phases 2 and 4 
(see Figure1), these were divided between two lists, thus each list contained eight 
word-pairs of each difficulty level. 
Participants’ implicit theories of intelligence were measured using Dweck’s 
(1999) Theories of Intelligence scale. The scale contains 8 items, requiring 
participants to rate on a scale from 1(strongly agree) to 6(strongly disagree) the 
extent to which they endorse statements about the nature of intelligence. Four of 
these statements promote an entity view of intelligence (eg. “To be honest, you can't 
really change how intelligent you are”), and four endorse an incremental view (eg. 
“No matter who you are, you can significantly change your intelligence level”). The 
incremental statements were reverse coded, so that each person received a mean 
theories of intelligence score between 1 and 6, whereby scores closest to 1 indicate 
entity orientation, and scores closer to 6 reflect an incremental orientation. Although 
various forms of the scale have been used in the literature (eg Dweck, 1990; Claro et 
al., 2016), it is consistently reported as having good reliability (internal and 2-week 
test-retest) and validity (see Dweck et al., 1995; Blackwell et al., 2007; De Castella 
& Byrne, 2015). Miele and colleagues (2011) reported the full 8 item scale as having 
good internal reliability (α = .96), which the findings from the present study were 
consistent with (α = .89).  
Participants also completed a demographics and language experience 
questionnaire designed to screen for proficiency in Spanish (see Appendix D).  
14 
 
 
Procedure 
 
Figure 1 Experiment proper procedure. 
 
Participants were informed verbally that they would be asked to learn some 
English words and their Spanish translations. They were told that they would be 
presented with the words for fixed amounts of time, asked to make judgements about 
their learning, restudy the material, and complete some tests along the way. 
Participants were asked to try to learn the words to the best of their ability, however 
they were informed they could skip test items that they were unable to answer. All 
other instructions, which were provided onscreen by the computer throughout the 
study, can be found in Appendix E.  
The study began with demonstration slides to familiarise participants with the 
layout of the word-pairs (English word on the left, Spanish translation on the right), 
and to allow them to practise using the JOL rating scale.  
The experiment proper comprised 6 main phases (see Figure 1), and was 
designed to follow the basic structure of a student preparing for an exam. Phase one 
was an initial encoding and JOL phase. As in Kornell and Metcalfe’s studies (2006, 
3a & 3b), the English-Spanish word-pairs were presented individually at a fixed rate, 
and participants were asked to make a JOL immediately after each word-pair 
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disappeared. In Kornell and Metcalfe’s study, word-pairs were presented for 4 
seconds each. Miele and colleagues (2011, Study 2) also used this same pace, 
however they concluded that this timing limited their participants’ ability to make 
attributions based on engagement. It was therefore decided in the present study to 
extend the presentation time for each word-pair to 10 seconds, to increase the 
opportunity for participants to engage with each word-pair, whilst still limiting their 
ability to achieve mastery.  
After the 10 seconds per word-pair expired, participants were asked to make a 
JOL. On each JOL screen, participants were asked to respond to the question “How 
confident are you (0%-100%) that you could type the Spanish translation if tested in 
a few minutes?” by clicking and dragging slider handles on a scale. The JOL screens 
also presented the instruction to “Please answer quickly” to discourage participants 
from using this time to rehearse or study the word-pair they had just viewed. After 
participants worked through the first list (List 1), a 30 second break was enforced to 
reduce fatigue effects. A countdown timer displayed onscreen informed participants 
of the break time remaining. Once the break concluded, participants worked through 
the second list (List 2) of word-pairs in the same manner as the first.  
In the second phase, participants were asked to make study choices. As in 
Kornell and Metcalfe (2006, Study 3b), the English cue-words from the word-pairs 
shown in List 1 were presented simultaneously onscreen, and participants were 
instructed to select half of the words for restudy. In order to explore the extent to 
which participants could discriminate between learned and unlearned items, 
participants were required to choose from all the word-pairs presented in each list, 
and were instructed to ‘select word-pairs to study that you think you have not yet 
learned’ (whereas Kornell and Metcalfe only allowed participants to choose from 
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word-pairs they had not correctly recalled on an initial test). Therefore, participants 
were instructed to choose 12 out of 24 items from each list. Once participants 
completed their study choices for List 1, they were required to do the same for List 2 
on the next screen. Before moving onto the initial test phase, participants completed 
a three minute maths problems distractor task. 
The third phase was the initial cued-recall test. The instructions indicated that 
this was a self-paced practice test, for which only words spelled accurately would be 
marked as being correct. All of the English cue-words were presented individually in 
a randomized order, and participants were required to type the Spanish translation of 
each word. As in Kornell and Metcalfe (2006, Studies 3a & 3b), answers had to be 
spelled exactly as they were presented to be considered accurate. 
In the fourth phase participants were able to restudy word-pairs based on the 
selections they made in phase three. The restudy phase had two within-participant 
conditions: honour, and dishonour. In the honour condition, each word-pair selected 
for restudy was shown on screen for 10 seconds. In the dishonour condition, only 
word-pairs that participants did not select for restudy were presented. If participants 
have accurate metacognitive monitoring, and make optimal study choices, their recall 
should be higher for their honour list than for their dishonour list. Therefore, 
participants with poorer metacognitive monitoring may benefit to a lesser extent 
from being allowed to choose the items they requested. Each participant completed 
both conditions, and was randomly allocated to either receive the honour condition 
for List 1 and the dishonour condition for List 2, or to receive the dishonour 
condition for List 1 and the honour condition for List 2. The instructions informed 
participants that ‘The word pairs that appear may, or may not, be the ones you 
requested’. This instruction was included to reduce the likelihood of participants 
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becoming confused by being shown words that they had not requested, or assuming 
that the software was malfunctioning. Participants then completed another three 
minute maths problems filler task before moving onto phase five. 
The fifth phase was the final test. Aside from being introduced as a final test, 
it was otherwise identical to the initial test in phase three (although the word orders 
were re-randomized).  
In the final phase, participants filled out the demographics and language 
experience questionnaire, as well as the Theories of Intelligence Scale (Dweck, 
1999).  
Results 
 To assess the relationship between confidence (JOLs) and accuracy on the 
initial test, three measures of calibration were utilised: the calibration statistic, the 
over/under-confidence statistic (O/U), and the Adjusted Normalized Discrimination 
Index (ANDI). Calibration approaches have been advocated in the confidence-
accuracy literature, as they are argued to be more informative and less biased than 
other measures, such as point-biserial correlations (e.g. Juslin, Olsson, and Winman 
1996; Palmer, Brewer, Weber & Nagesh, 2013). Whilst each of these measures make 
assessments of the confidence-accuracy relationship, they examine discrete elements 
of it (Yaniv, Yates & Smith, 1991; Palmer et al., 2013). The calibration statistic 
provides information about how far accuracy deviates from the expected pattern of 
results that would occur if each level of confidence perfectly predicted accuracy. 
Figure (2) provides a visual representation of what perfect calibration would look 
like: 30% of the responses that are given 30% confidence are actually correct, 60% 
of the responses at 60% confidence are correct and so forth. The calibration statistic 
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indexes how far observed calibration differs from the perfect calibration line, 
producing values between 0 (prefect calibration) to 1. The O/U statistic is a measure 
reflecting how average confidence ratings compare to overall accuracy, with values 
ranging from -1 (indicating on average, confidence was lower than accuracy) to +1 
(indicating on average, confidence was greater than accuracy). The ANDI statistic is 
a measure of discrimination, revealing how informative confidence judgements are 
for discriminating between correct and incorrect judgments, with values ranging 
from 0 to 1 (perfect discrimination). 
 
Figure 2. Perfect calibration curve. Each level of confidence accurately predicts 
accuracy. 
 
 To assess metacognitive monitoring during the study choice phase, an effect 
size (Cohen’s w) was calculated for each participant from a 2 x 2 Chi-square 
contingency table, comparing study decisions and performance on the initial test. As 
a guide, Cohen’s (1988) recommended values of 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5 were used as 
approximate guides to assess small, medium and large effects, respectively. Figure 3 
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depicts the contingency table for a participant with perfect metacognitive monitoring; 
all responses would fall in quadrant a (items not chosen for restudy and correctly 
recalled on initial test) and d (items chosen for restudy and not recalled on initial 
test).  
  
Figure 3. Representation of 2 (accuracy) x 2 (restudy decision) Chi-square table used 
to calculate an effect size for each participant’s metacognitive monitoring. All 
responses for perfect monitoring would fall in quadrants a and d. 
 
Following Miele and colleagues (2011), mixed Analyses of Covariances 
(ANCOVAs) were used to assess the relationships between word-pair difficulty 
(with-in subjects, 3 levels: easy, moderate, difficult) and confidence-accuracy 
statistics, with theory of intelligence (between subjects) as the covariate. This 
approach allows an interaction term between difficulty and theory of intelligence to 
be obtained, which is of central interest to the current study’s hypotheses1. Also 
following Miele et al., where significant interactions were found, they were followed 
up with bivariate correlations, to assess the relationship at each level of difficulty. 
                                                          
1 As a covariate, TOI was not observed as having a main effect on any measure of 
metacognitive monitoring (all F < 0.86, all p > .357). As these effects were not 
related to the hypotheses, they are not discussed further.  
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 As is common in the literature (eg. Robins & Pals, 2002; Miele et al., 2011), 
theory of intelligence was measured and entered as a continuous variable in all 
analyses, whereby smaller values indicate entity endorsement, and greater values 
suggest a more incremental orientation. This approach avoids the loss of power 
typically associated with dichotomising continuous variables (Cohen, 1983).  
Before formal analyses were conducted, all data was screened to assure that 
appropriate assumptions had been met. Due to skew in the distribution of the 
calibration data, a log10 transformation was used. Inspection of the histograms, P-P 
plots and skewness statistic for each level of difficulty of the calibration statistic 
indicated the transformation was successful at reducing the bias, thus the transformed 
data was retained for analyses. In cases where the assumption of sphericity was 
violated, as indicated by a significant Mauchley’s value, Greenhouse-geisser 
corrections were applied. All other assumptions were met. 
Manipulation check 
 To confirm the anticipated difficulty difference between easy, moderate and 
difficult word-pairs, a one-way repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
was conducted, with initial test performance as the dependent variable. Mauchley’s 
test indicated a violation of sphericity, thus a Greenhouse-geisser correction was 
used. A main effect of difficulty was observed, F(1.38, 88.19) = 228.07, p <.001. 
Bonferroni adjusted paired-samples t-tests revealed participants recalled more easy 
words (M = 6.29, SD =3.21) than moderate word-pairs (M = 1.12, SD =1.72), t(64) = 
17.21, p <.001, 95%CIdifference[4.57, 5.77], d = 2.48, and more moderate words than 
difficult words (M = 0.2, SD = 0.12), t(64) = 5.18, p < .001, 95%CIdifference[0.68, 
1.53], d = 0.64.,  thus the manipulation was successful. 
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Confidence (JOLs) and accuracy 
To assess the relationship between theory of intelligence and the utility of 
JOLs for predicting actual performance at each level of confidence, the effect of 
difficulty (within subjects) and theory of intelligence (covariate) on the calibration 
(transformed) statistic was analysed using an ANCOVA2. It was anticipated that 
greater endorsement of incremental views of intelligence would be associated with 
poorer calibration, especially for easy and difficult items (as perceived fluency was 
anticipated to be highest and lowest for these word-pairs, respectively). A significant 
main effect of difficulty was found, F(1.58, 97.89) = 6.69, p = .002. η2p = .10 
(Greenhouse-Geisser correction). This main effect was interpreted in the context of 
the marginally significant interaction observed between difficulty and theory of 
intelligence, which was of central concern to the hypothesis, F(1.58, 97.89) = 2.88, p 
= .073, η2 p = .04. To further investigate the nature of this interaction, a series of 
bivariate correlations were run to examine the relationship between theory of 
intelligence and calibration statistics for each level of word-pair difficulty. The 
relationships between theory of intelligence and calibration statistics were non-
significant for both the easy (r = -.085, p = .503) and moderate (r = .046, p = .714) 
items. Whilst also non-significant at the alpha level of .05, the relationship observed 
for the difficult items trended in a positive direction, suggesting that for these items, 
endorsing a more incremental view of intelligence was associated with poorer 
calibration (r = .235, p = .062). Thus this finding offers some support for the 
hypothesised compromised metacognitive monitoring of incremental theorists, as 
observed by Miele et al., (2011).  
                                                          
2 Descriptive statistics for confidence-accuracy analyses are reported in Table1  
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Table 1  
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Confidence-Accuracy Statistics 
 Easy Moderate Difficult Total 
Calibration Statistic* 0.15 (0.13) 0.15 (0.10) 0.08 (0.08) 0.11 (0.08) 
Log10 Calibration 
Statistic* 
-0.95 (0.36) -0.98 (0.47) -1.35 (0.54) -1.06 (0.33) 
O/U* 0.23 (0.23) 0.28 (0.17) 0.20 (0.14) 0.23 (0.14) 
ANDI - - - 0.32 (0.20) 
Cohen’s w 0.29 (0.20) 0.19 (0.21) 0.16 (0.14) 0.32 (0.21) 
Note: Perfect metacognitive monitoring for statistics marked with * equals 0; otherwise, 
higher values represent superior monitoring. ANDI values were not calculated separately 
for easy, medium and difficult levels.   
 
In order to investigate the effect of theory of intelligence on participants’ 
average confidence ratings for each level of word-pair difficulty, an ANCOVA was 
conducted with the O/U statistic as the dependant variable. It was hypothesised that 
greater endorsement of incremental views of intelligence would be associated with 
under-confidence for easy word-pairs, and over-confidence for difficult word-pairs. 
The ANCOVA revealed a non-significant main effect of difficulty, F(1.39, 87.40) = 
1.03, p = .336, η2p = .02 (Greenhouse-Geisser correction). The interaction between 
difficulty and theory of intelligence was also non-significant, F(1.39, 87.40) = 0.95, 
p = .362, η2p = .02. These findings suggest that on average, the extent of over- or 
under-confidence did not differ as a result of incremental indorsement and difficulty 
levels. 
To assess the relationship between theory of intelligence and the utility of 
participants’ JOLs in discriminating between learned and unlearned word-pairs, a 
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linear regression was run between theory of intelligence and mean ANDI scores3. It 
was hypothesised that greater endorsement of incremental views of intelligence 
would be associated with poorer discrimination between learned and unlearned 
word-pairs. Theory of intelligence was not found to predict a significant amount of 
the variance in participants’ ANDI statistic, R2 = .01, F(1, 63) = .67, p = .415. 
Neither the unstandardized (B = -.02) or the standardized (β = -.10) slopes differed 
significantly from 0, t(63) = -.82, p = .415. Consequently, theory of intelligence did 
not appear to influence overall discrimination. 
Study decisions & accuracy 
In order to investigate whether theories of intelligence impact metacognitive 
monitoring after a delay (i.e. when making study decisions), an ANCOVA with each 
participant’s metacognitive monitoring effect size (Cohen’s w) as the dependant 
variable was conducted. Two possible outcomes were predicted: either incremental 
theorists would have difficulty discerning the items that they had and had not 
learned, and thus would have smaller effect sizes for their metacognitive monitoring, 
or alternatively, the delayed-JOL-effect (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991) would result in 
any differences between incremental and entity theorists disappearing. The 
ANCOVA revealed a main effect of difficulty, F(2, 126) = 9.72, p < .001, η2p = .13. 
Of central interest to the present study, an interaction was observed between 
difficulty and theories of intelligence, F(2,126) = 5.59, p = .005, η2p = .08. To 
investigate the nature of the interaction, separate bivariate correlations were 
conducted for each level of difficulty. A significant weak-moderate negative 
                                                          
3 Calculation of the ANDI statistic requires participants to provide at least one correct 
and one incorrect response. The majority of participants did not achieve this for 
moderate and difficult items, hence ANDI scores were collapsed across all difficulty 
levels for this analysis.  
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relationship was observed for easy word-pairs, r = -.260, p = .036, suggesting that 
greater endorsement of incremental views of intelligence was associated with poorer 
metacognitive monitoring during study decisions. The correlations for moderate 
word-pairs (r =.049) and difficult word-pairs (r = .202) were both non-significant, (p 
= .699 and, p = .106, respectively). These findings provide some evidence that 
incremental theorists may experience compromised metacognitive monitoring, even 
with delayed judgments.  
Study approaches 
What did people choose? To investigate the study approach participants 
tended to follow (DR vs. RPL), a paired-samples t-test was conducted between mean 
JOLs for items chosen for restudy and the items not chosen. As participants were 
expected to follow a RPL approach (by choosing word-pairs to restudy that they did 
not currently know, but perceived would be easy to learn), it was hypothesised that 
mean JOLs would be greater for the items chosen for restudy than those not chosen. 
Contrary to this hypothesis, participants chose items for restudy that had lower JOLs 
(M = 37.47, SD = 13.82) than items not chosen for restudy (M = 48.66, SD = 16.94), 
which represented a medium effect (t(64) = -5.37, p <.001, 95% CIdiff[-15.36, -7.03], 
d = .72). Furthermore, an ANCOVA investigating the effect of choice on JOLs, with 
theory of intelligence as the covariate, revealed a non-significant main effect for 
theory of intelligence, F(1, 63) = 0.20, p = .656, η2p = .004. Thus, theory of 
intelligence did not appear to influence the study approach adopted. To allow a 
closer comparison to Kornell and Metcalfe’s (2006, Study 3a & 3b) design, the same 
                                                          
4 The ANCOVA produced a non-significant main effect of choice, F(1, 63) = 0.56, p 
= .457, η2p = .00. Given the moderate effect size revealed by the paired-samples t-
test, the t-test analysis was considered as better representing the data.  
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analysis was run, however only for the word-pairs which participants got incorrect on 
the initial test. Once again, participants chose word-pairs for restudy that they had 
assigned lower JOLs to (M = 35.67, SD = 13.90) compared to the items not chosen 
for restudy (M = 41.32, SD = 15.98), which represented a small effect, t(64) = -3.12, 
p = .003, 95% CIdiff[-9.28, -2.04], d = .38. Moreover, non-significant main effect of 
theory of intelligence was again observed from an ANCOVA, F(1, 63) = 1.64, p = 
.205, η2p = .035. Together, these results suggest participants in the present study 
tended to follow a DR approach.  
What should people have chosen? To investigate which study approach 
(DR or RPL) was the more optimal approach in the current study, a linear regression 
was conducted. Based on the RPL framework, it was hypothesised that there would 
be a positive relationship between the JOLs for items chosen for restudy and final 
recall performance6,7. The regression revealed participants’ mean JOLs for items 
chosen for restudy did not predict a significant amount of the variance in final test 
recall, R2 = .02, F(1, 62) = 1.33, p = .253. Neither the unstandardized (B = 0.03) or 
the standardized (β = 0.15) slopes differed from 0, t(62) = 1.15, p = .253.  Once 
more, to allow a closer comparison to Kornell and Metcalfe (2006, Study 3a & 3b), 
the relationship of JOLs chosen only for the items that were incorrect on the initial 
test were used to predict final test recall (for these items). Again, participants’ mean 
JOLs for items that they chose for restudy (and got wrong on an initial test) did not 
predict a significant amount of the variance in their final test recall, R2 = .02, F(1, 62) 
                                                          
5 Once again, the ANCOVA produced a non-significant main effect of choice, F(1, 
63) = 0.46, p = .457, η2p = .01, despite the moderate effect size found in the t-test, 
thus the t-test is considered to best represent the data.. 
6 These analyses were only conducted on the final recall of items in the honour 
condition. 
7 Due to a software error, one participant’s final recall data was not saved; analyses 
for final recall are therefore based off 64 participants. 
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= 1.52, p = .223. Neither the unstandardized (B = 0.02) or the standardized (β = 0.16) 
slopes differed from 0, t(62) = 1.23, p = .223. These results suggest that the current 
participants’ performance on the final test was not associated with their tendency to 
select items based off a RPL or DR framework. 
 Finally, regardless of the study approach taken, it was also of interest to know 
if participants were generally able to make optimal study decisions. To investigate 
this, a paired-samples t-test was conducted between final test performance in the 
honour and dishonour conditions. If participants made good study choices, their 
recall for the word-pairs in the list in which their study decisions were honoured 
would be expected to be greater than their recall for the dishonour condition. 
Surprisingly, this was not the case. Participants’ recall for word-pairs in the honour 
condition (M = 5.25, SD = 3.51) was no different than their recall in the dishonour 
condition (M = 5.25, SD = 3.37), t = 0, thus it appears they did not benefit at all from 
making study decisions.    
Discussion 
The current study sought to investigate the relationship between theories of 
intelligence and metacognitive monitoring. Contrary to the hypotheses, most of the 
confidence-accuracy measures failed to reveal impaired monitoring for incremental 
theorists. Greater endorsement of an incremental theory of intelligence was not 
associated with general over-confidence or under-confidence, nor did it seem to 
hinder participants’ ability to immediately discriminate learned from unlearned 
word-pairs, for any level of difficulty. The only support for the hypotheses regarding 
immediate confidence and accuracy was a trend towards a positive relationship 
between theories of intelligence and the calibration statistic for difficult word-pairs. 
Thus, the current findings are largely in contrast to those of Miele and colleagues 
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(2011, Study 1; & Molden, 2010, Study 4). Impaired metacognitive monitoring was 
observed however for incremental theorists in their ability to appropriately choose 
easy items for restudy. Although it was anticipated that greater incremental 
endorsement may be associated with poorer discrimination in study choices, this 
finding was somewhat surprising given the very limited indication of monitoring 
impairment for incremental theorists in their initial confidence ratings.  
On most measures of metacognitive accuracy, the current study failed to 
replicate the impairments for incremental theorists observed by Miele et al. (2011). 
At best, only limited support was found for the suggestion that theories of 
intelligence influence metacognitive monitoring. These findings may therefore imply 
that less concern about the possible drawbacks of incremental orientation is 
warranted than Miele and colleagues (Miele & Molden, 2010; Miele et al., 2011; 
Miele, Son & Metcalfe, 2013) have suggested.   
When considering the contrast in results observed between Miele et al.’s 
(2011) findings and the present study, it is important to consider other factors that 
may have contributed to the disparity. One such example may be linked to the 
distribution of scores in the present study on theories of intelligence scale. There are 
two possible explanations of how the spread of data could reduce the likelihood of 
observing strong relationships between theory of intelligence and metacognitive 
monitoring. Firstly, if the distribution of scores was highly clustered, this would 
undermine the ability of the correlation statistic to detect strong relationships. As this 
was not apparent in the current sample, with mean scores ranging from 2 to 6, it is 
unlikely that the correlations were statistically undermined. A more likely 
explanation is that not enough participants’ mean theories of intelligence score fell 
on either side of the scale’s midpoint. Indeed, only 6 out of 65 participants had a 
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mean score less than the midpoint of 3 (indicating they endorsed more entity views 
of intelligence), whilst 59 participants’ score fell above 3 (suggesting more 
incremental orientation). Thus, the current study was mostly commenting on 
participants who ultimately endorsed incremental views of intelligence, just to a 
greater or lesser extent. If the midpoint of the scale represents a critical threshold, 
whereby having a mean theories of intelligence score above 3 makes one’s 
interpretive frameworks fundamentally different to those whose mean score falls 
below 3, then the failure to observe impaired monitoring for incremental theorists 
may be due to an inadequately sized group of entity theorists in the current study.  
The recruitment of a sample with such a small proportion of entity theorists 
was unanticipated, as similar results have either not been reported in studies of 
theories of intelligence (e.g. Miele et al., 2011; Miele & Molden, 2010), or else the 
magnitude of the difference between incremental theorists and entity theorists 
recruited was not as extreme (e.g. Hong et al., 1999). For example, even though only 
30 out of 97 of participants recruited by Hong and colleagues in Study 1, and 64 out 
of 168 participants from Study 2, were classified as entity theorists, the percentages 
of entity theorists recruited from their university population (31% and 38% 
respectively) were far greater than the 9% in the current study. The relatively small 
proportion of entity theorists observed may have occurred due to chance, thus with 
additional recruitment more entity theorists may participate, which might allow for a 
clearer comparison of the two theories of intelligence.  
Alternatively, the design of the current study (in which participants were 
asked to learn the word-pairs to the best of their ability over multiple study trials, and 
with multiple tests, prior to completing the theory of intelligence scale) may have 
primed them to provide more incremental responses. Given that theories of 
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intelligence were assessed in the same way by Miele and colleagues (2011), it seems 
unlikely that completing the scale after studying would bias mean ratings. To address 
the possibility that a discreet element of the current study (not present in Miele et 
al.,) influenced ratings, future research could utilise a pre-testing session to assess 
theories of intelligence (as in Miele & Molden, 2010, Studies 3-5). It should also be 
noted that some researchers have suggested it may be preferable at times to assess 
theories of intelligence with entity endorsing items alone (e.g. Dweck, 1999; Hong et 
al., 1999). Hong and colleagues reported finding evidence in pilot studies that 
participants who endorse entity statements also tend to demonstrate increased 
incremental endorsement as they work through the scale. This observation may be 
due to the perceived social desirability of incremental orientation (Hong et al., 1999). 
Despite this suggestion however, using the full 8-item theories of intelligence scale, 
Miele and colleagues (& Molden, 2010; et al., 2011) still found differences between 
entity and incremental theorists.  
Another possible explanation for why strong relationships were not observed 
between theories of intelligence and metacognitive monitoring may be as a result of 
the rate of stimulus presentation enforced in the current study. Indeed, Miele and 
colleagues’ (et al., 2011, Study 1; & Molden, 2010; Studies 4 &5) findings of 
compromised monitoring for incremental theorists occurred when participants were 
able to pace their own study. Moreover, in Miele et al.’s (2011) Study 2, in which 
items were presented for 4 seconds each, incremental theorists’ confidence ratings 
did not differ between fluency conditions. Miele and colleagues suggested this may 
have been the result of the study pace limiting incremental theorists’ ability to feel 
engaged in the material. Whilst this may provide a plausible explanation in that 
particular study, in the current study this explanation seems less likely to apply, due 
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to the 10 second rate of presentation. Considering incremental theorists in Miele and 
colleagues’ Study 1 spent a mean time of 3.46 seconds studying each Indonesian-
English word-pair (whilst entity theorists spent 5.59 seconds), and demonstrated poor 
calibration across word-pair difficulty, it seems unlikely that 10 seconds per word-
pair in the present study would have comparatively impaired their ability to feel 
engaged with the material.  
Another aim of the present study was to investigate the study approaches that 
participants tend to follow. Specifically, the present study aimed to add further 
support to the RPL paradigm (Kornell & Metcalfe, 2006; Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005). 
Given the time constraints imposed by the fixed stimulus presentation pace in current 
study, it was surprising to observe that participants’ study choices reflected a DR 
approach. This finding was in direct contrast to the anticipated pattern of results, as 
the RPL literature suggests when study time is limited, people focus their study 
resources on the easiest unlearned items (Kornell & Metcalfe, 2006; Metcalfe & 
Kornell, 2005; Son & Metcalfe, 2000). Although the pace of 10 seconds per word-
pair provided greater study time than participants in Kornell and Metcalfe’s Studies 
3a and 3b were allowed (4 seconds per word-pair), mastery was still not likely to be 
obtained. Indeed, mean recall on both the initial and final tests were quite low 
(15.63% and 22.89% respectively), as were mean JOLs, (M = 42.62, SD = 28.91), 
thus not only was mastery not likely, participants also appeared to be aware of this. 
Moreover, this pattern of study allocation was observed when analyses were 
restricted to choices of items that were demonstrated as being unknown by 
performance on the initial test. A likely explanation for this surprising finding is that 
the instructions provided during the study choice phase were interpreted by 
participants as requesting choices be made in a DR manner. The instruction to ‘select 
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word-pairs to study that you think you have not yet learned’ was designed to assess 
the central concern of the present study: whether incremental theorists would exhibit 
compromised metacognitive monitoring, in this case, when discerning known from 
unknown items after a delay. It is possible however that this instruction may have 
encouraged participants to select the items they were most certain they had not 
learned (which would likely be the word-pairs assigned the lowest JOLs – thus 
resulting in a DR pattern of choosing). Therefore, any conclusions made in regards to 
typical study behaviours based on the findings of the present study should be 
tentative, and must take this possible procedural confound into account.   
Another possible explanation for the observed DR approach in the present 
study may again result to the predominantly incremental sample. As incremental 
theorists are oriented towards challenge and learning goals (Dweck, 1999), they may 
have intentionally sought the most difficult items. Again, the nature of the current 
sample limits the opportunity to meaningfully comment on this possibility, therefore 
future research may benefit from recruiting more entity theorists, and utilising 
alternate instructions or designs to investigate whether theory of intelligence 
influences preferred study behaviours.  
Surprisingly, in the current study, participants did not seem to benefit from 
controlling their own study; neither a DR or RPL study approach, nor controlling 
study in general, was associated with higher final test recall. It is possible that this 
finding may also have occurred as a consequence of the current study’s design. As 
participants tended to choose word-pairs with low JOLs, in the honour condition they 
would have received these to study, however in the dishonour condition they would 
have tended to receive word-pairs with higher JOLs (more akin to a RPL approach). 
Based on Kornell and Metcalfe’s (2006, Studies 3a & 3b) research indicating that 
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following a RPL results in higher final test recall than a DR approach, the benefits 
they also observed on recall from participants being able to control their own study 
(compared to having their study choices dishonoured) may have been cancelled out 
in the current study by the high-JOL-nature of the dishonour condition.  
In summary, whilst the current study found some indications of compromised 
metacognitive monitoring for incremental theorists, the majority of measures failed 
to demonstrate this effect. The present study therefore does not provide compelling 
support for the suggestion that promoting incremental orientation is likely to impair 
student’s metacognitive accuracy (Miele & Molden, 2010; Miele et al., 2011; Miele, 
Son & Metcalfe, 2013). However, in light of the aforementioned limitations 
(especially the predominantly incremental sample), any conclusions based on the 
current study can only be tentative at best. If future research addresses these 
limitations and finds further evidence for the impairment of incremental theorists’ 
metacognitive monitoring, this may warrant reconsideration of the advice educators 
provide students (Miele, et al., 2013). Currently, researchers are calling for policy 
makers and educators to nurture incremental orientations in students through 
educational systems and interventions (Rattan, Savani, Chugh & Dweck, 2015). To 
be clear, given the literature identifying the overwhelming benefits of being an 
incremental theorist on educational outcomes (e.g. Claro et al., 2016; Henderson & 
Dweck, 1990), it is not suggested that these interventions be opposed. Rather, if more 
compelling evidence indicates that incremental theorists experience impaired 
metacognitive monitoring, these interventions could perhaps be optimised by 
including strategies to help students compensate for any compromised monitoring 
they may experience. In such a case, incremental theorists may benefit from utilising 
strategies such as self-testing, which has been demonstrated not only as a strategy 
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useful for assessing actual learning, but also provides an additional learning 
experience in itself (Finn & Tauber, 2015). Overall, whilst the aforementioned 
limitations mean the findings of the current study should be regarded as tentative, the 
findings provide little reason to suggest incremental theorists are likely to experience 
major metacognitive drawbacks during learning and study.  
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Appendix D: Demographics and Language Experience Questionnaire 
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Appendix E: Study Instructions (via Limesurvey) 
In this study you will be shown word-pairs containing English words and their 
Spanish translations.  
Example word-pair:    airport – aeropuerto 
(English word)   (Spanish word) 
Your task is to learn these words to the best of your ability in preparation for a final 
test. In the final test, you will be asked to type the Spanish translation of each 
English word.  
After each word pair is shown, you will be asked to rate how confident you are that 
in a few minutes you will be able to come up with the Spanish word when the 
English word is presented. You will be asked to make this rating on a scale between 
0% - 100%, whereby 0% means you are not at all confident, and 100% means you 
are very confident that you will be able to type the Spanish translation correctly. 
Example word-pair: airport – aeropuerto 
Example confidence rating: How confident are you (0%-100%) that you could type 
the Spanish translation if tested in a few minutes? Please answer quickly. Please 
click and drag the slider handles to enter your answer. 
When the study phase begins, each word pair will be shown for 10 seconds. When 
you are ready to begin the study phase, click next. 
[List1]  
It is now time for a quick break. In 30 seconds you will be shown more word pairs to 
learn. 
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[List2] 
Below are some of the English cues from the word-pairs you were shown in Phase 1. 
In a moment, you will have the opportunity to study half of these words with their 
Spanish translations. In order to achieve the best possible result on the upcoming 
final test (in which you will have to type the Spanish translation of each English 
word), you should select word-pairs to study that you think you have not yet learned. 
Please choose EXACTLY TWELVE (12) of the words from the list below to 
restudy. [Same instructions administered for List 2] 
[Filler task 1] Now you have 3 minutes to solve as many of the following maths 
problems as possible. Please enter your answers in the correct order in the box 
below. Separate each answer with a comma ( , ). 
You will now be given a practice test on the word-pairs you were shown in Phase 1. 
When each English word is shown, your task is to type the Spanish translation of that 
word. Please take care with your spelling, as only words that are spelled correctly 
will be marked as being right. Once you have typed an answer, please click next to 
move on to the next item. Click next to begin the test. 
[Cued-recall List 1] 
[Cued recall List 2] 
You will now be given the opportunity to study half of the word-pairs. The word-
pairs will appear on the screen one at a time for 7 seconds each. The word pairs that 
appear may, or may not, be the ones you requested. 
[Restudy List 1] 
[Restudy List 2] 
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[Distractor task 2, instructions as above] 
It is now time for the final test. When each English word is shown, your task is to 
type the Spanish translation of that word. Please take care with your spelling, as only 
words that are spelled correctly will be marked as being right. Once you have typed 
an answer, please click next to move on to the next item. 
[Final Test] 
[Demographics questionnaire] 
[Theories of intelligence scale] 
Thank you for your participation.  Your time is very much appreciated. Please see 
the researcher if you have any comments or questions. 
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Appendix F: Output Summaries of Analyses  
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